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This paper uses aggregate data for the major pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. to 
study the rate of growth in pharmaceutical R&D intensity over the period from 1952 to 2001. 
The theoretical model argues and the empirical findings suggest that pharmaceutical R&D 
spending increases with real drug prices, after holding constant other determinants of R&D. 
Simulations based on our multiple regression model indicate that the capitalized value of 
pharmaceutical R&D spending would have been about 30 percent lower if the federal 
government had limited the rate of growth in drug price increases to the rate of growth in the 
general consumer price index during the period 1980 to 2001. Moreover, a drug price control 
regime would have resulted in 330 to 365 fewer new drugs brought to the global market during 
that same time period. 
   1
Explaining Pharmaceutical R&D Growth Rates at the Industry Level: New Perspectives 
and Insights 
 




Benjamin Franklin once remarked “in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except 
death and taxes”.  Spokespersons for the pharmaceutical industry might be inclined to argue that 
the benefit-generating capability of prescription drugs also belongs in this exclusive category.  
They could make a compelling case: recent studies suggest that pharmaceutical products increase 
longevity, improve quality of life, and often result in medical cost savings (Lichtenberg, 1996, 
2001a; Weidenbaum, 1993). Moreover, pharmaceutical products have significantly reduced the 
death rates associated with such diseases as tuberculosis, kidney infection, and hypertension.  
  Industry analysts are quick to point out that these benefits come at a significant cost: on 
average, firms invest hundreds of millions of dollars over many years into research and 
development (R&D) to bring a single new chemical entity (NCE) to market.  In fact, recent 
estimates suggest it takes approximately 16 years and costs $802 million to bring a NCE to 
market (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 2003; PhRMA Industry Profile 2003).
i  These R&D 
activities involve discovery research, pre-clinical testing, and successive and time-consuming 
clinical trials.  The latter are needed to demonstrate safety, efficacy, and quality before the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will approve a new drug for marketing. 
  Because of the important benefits promised by new drug innovations and the sizeable 
costs associated with the innovation process, a number of researchers have explored the 
determinants of pharmaceutical R&D. Not surprisingly, a major aspect of these studies concerns 
how various types of public policies, such as drug price regulations, might affect pharmaceutical 
R&D. The notion is that public policies should foster, or at least not inhibit, R&D investment, 
particularly investments that offer societal benefits in excess of costs.  For example, less than 10 
years ago the Health Care Reform Act of 1993 proposed various types of price controls on the 
pharmaceutical industry.  While Congress did not pass this Act, the mere threat that it would be 
passed appeared to have a large negative effect on the market value of many pharmaceutical 
firms (Ellison and Mullin, 2001).  Had the Act actually been passed, Grabowski (1994)   2
hypothesizes a substantial decline in R&D expenditures and innovative activity would have 
occurred.  
Although empirical insights have been realized through previous research on the 
determinants of firm R&D expenditures in the pharmaceutical industry (Grabowski, 1968; 
Grabowski and Vernon, 1981, 1990, 2000; and Vernon, 2003), only Scherer (2001) has 
conducted an analysis at the industry level.  His study, however, was not an analysis of the 
determinants of pharmaceutical R&D per se; rather, it was an examination of the dynamic 
relationship between gross profitability and pharmaceutical R&D.  To be certain, there is a major 
advantage to an industry-level analysis: only at the industry level are data available on 
pharmaceutical R&D expenditures, as opposed to total R&D expenditures.  Because most major 
pharmaceutical firms are diversified across multiple industries, total-firm R&D often includes 
expenditures on such non-pharmaceutical products as industrial chemicals, medical supplies, and 
consumer products.
ii  As a result, all previous firm-level studies have been hampered by the 
quality of the R&D data.
iii  For this reason we believe an industry-level study provides the most 
promising context for conducting an empirical investigation of the determinants of 
pharmaceutical R&D, and for considering how, for example, the regulation of pharmaceutical 
prices in the U.S. might impact R&D.  
  To improve upon earlier studies, we use industry-level data to investigate the 
determinants of pharmaceutical R&D.  In addition, we focus on the theoretical and empirical 
relation between drug prices and R&D instead of the relation between drug profits and R&D, as 
earlier studies have tended to do. Exploring the relation between drug prices and R&D is 
theoretically more appealing because most proposals aimed at “excessive” drug profits have 
involved price controls rather than profit controls or taxes.
iv  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. In section II the theoretical 
relation between real drug prices and R&D spending is discussed in some detail and data are 
presented to show the empirical relation between these two variables over the period from 1952 
to 2001. Section III develops the empirical model and specifies a first-differences model (in logs) 
to isolate the empirical relation between the rate of growth of real drug prices and 
pharmaceutical R&D intensity. Section IV considers policy implications, and section V provides 
a brief summary and conclusion. 
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2. Real Drug Prices and R&D Spending by Major U.S. Drug Companies 
 
Following Grabowski and Vernon (1981), our conceptual model begins by assuming that 
the optimal amount of pharmaceutical R&D spending, like any investment, depends on its future 
stream of expected marginal revenues and costs. Microeconomic theory suggests that the 
marginal revenues (MR) from successive equal increments of R&D spending decline with use 
because of diminishing returns. We also allow a set of exogenous factors, X, to influence the 
marginal returns from R&D in the conceptual model. Marginal cost (MC) is assumed to be 
independent of R&D spending but is allowed to depend on a set of external factors, Z. In 
mathematical terms, the profit-maximizing pharmaceutical company finds the optimal amount of 
R&D spending, R&D*, by solving the following equation:  
      MR (R&D, X)  =  MC (Z),          (1) 
Solving equation 1 for the optimal amount of R&D spending in terms of the exogenous variables 
gives:  
   R & D *   =   f   ( X ,   Z ) .        ( 2 )  
Factors that increase the marginal revenues from R&D spending, X, lead to increased 
spending on R&D. Similarly, factors that raise marginal costs, Z, lead to lower R&D 
expenditures.  Within this conceptual framework, we hypothesize that a direct relation exists 
between drug prices and pharmaceutical R&D. The expected direct relation between drug prices 
and pharmaceutical R&D holds for a couple of reasons. First, as an input in the innovative 
process, the demand for R&D represents a derived demand. Like any derived demand, the 
demand for R&D spending increases with the actual or expected price of the drug it helps to 
produce, so marginal revenues, vector-X in equation 2, increase. Thus, a rise in actual or 
expected drug prices should be associated with increased pharmaceutical R&D because of this 
derived-demand effect. 
Second, the variable costs of manufacturing drugs are very low. The sunk costs 
associated with R&D comprise a large proportion of overall costs; thus, rising drug prices reflect 
growing profit margins and greater internal cash flow.  Internal cash flow represents a major 
source of financing for R&D given external capital market imperfections, such that the cost of 
using internal funds tends to be less than that of acquiring external funds (Hall, 1992; Hubbard, 
1998). Internal cash flow has been shown to be a particularly important source of financing for   4
pharmaceutical R&D (Grabowski and Vernon, 2000; Vernon, 2003).  Thus, in some sense, drug 
prices also act as a marginal cost shifter, Z, in equation 2.  As cash flow increases with rising 
drug prices, the marginal cost of financing declines and the optimal amount of R&D spending 
increases, all other factors held constant.  
With this hypothesized direct relation between drug prices and R&D in mind, exhibit 1 
uses published data from PhRMA (2003, 1971) to show pharmaceutical R&D expenditures as a 
percent of sales, or R&D intensity, and its relation to changes in real drug prices over the 50-year 
period from 1952 to 2001
v. R&D intensity rather than the level of R&D expenditures is analyzed 
to directly control for scale and because virtually all of the studies on this topic examine R&D 
intensity. It is also a well-known fact that firm managers in the pharmaceutical industry employ 
the R&D-to-sales ratio when making future year’s budgeting decisions. Before 1970, separate 
data are unavailable for domestic and global R&D spending of domestic pharmaceutical 
companies, so global R&D intensity figures are reported in Exhibit 1.
vi  
The real price of drugs for each year is measured by dividing the pharmaceutical 
consumer price index by the general consumer price index (CPI).
vii As noted by researchers, 
consumer price indices are not measured without error because substitution effects and quality 
changes over time are not fully incorporated (e.g., Hausman, 2003).  Several authors have also 
pointed out the biases that previously existed in pharmaceutical price indices because of (1); the 
undersampling of new drugs, (2); the failure to treat generic drugs as lower-priced substitutes for 
branded drugs rather than new drugs, and (3); the use of list instead of transaction prices (Berndt, 
Griliches, and Rosett, 1993; Scherer, 1993).
viii Nevertheless, the pharmaceutical price index 
represents the best available time series indicator of drug price swings in the U.S. Moreover, 
since we are examining changes in the ratio of the pharmaceutical and general CPI measures 
over time, some of the substitution and quality bias in the numerator and denominator may tend 
to cancel out. In addition, average year-to-year parameter estimates are obtained in the multiple 
regression analysis below. These short-run estimates may avoid some of the bias because 
sufficient time does not pass for substitution effects and quality changes to fully work themselves 
out.  It should be kept in mind, however, that any remaining measurement error biases the 
parameter estimates towards zero.  
Data in exhibit 1 show that pharmaceutical R&D intensity changed considerably over the 
50-year period, and that the changes in R&D intensity share a striking direct relation with   5
changes in real drug prices. In particular, notice that both real drug prices and pharmaceutical 
R&D intensity were rising during the 1950s. During the latter part of the 1960s and 1970s, 
however, R&D intensity languished as real drug prices began to decline in the beginning of the 
1960s.  
In addition to declining real drug prices, the Kefauver-Harris Amendment to the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 may have caused the slowdown in R&D intensity growth 
beginning in the 1960s. This 1962 Act arose in the aftermath of the thalidomide tragedy and 
established the requirement that the FDA must approve all new drugs. The Act greatly increased 
the regulatory requirements associated with bringing a pharmaceutical product to market (i.e., to 
gain FDA approval) and can be treated as increasing the Z-vector in equation 2. Consequently, 
many economists argue that the act raised the cost associated with R&D and exerted a negative 
influence on R&D spending.
ix  
Despite the 1962 Act, the 1980s witnessed a reversal in the trend with R&D intensity 
increasing from 8.9 percent to 14.8 in 1989. It may not be coincidental that the decade of the 
1980s was also characterized by rapidly rising real drug prices. But once again, a federal policy 
change may also explain some of the movement in R&D during the 1980s. Specifically, the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 increased the effective patent lives 
for branded pharmaceuticals. The so-called Waxman-Hatch Act extended the effective life of a 
new drug by a maximum of 5 years, but not beyond 14 years of effective life, if it can be shown 
the FDA delayed the introduction of a drug into the market by at least that amount of time. By 
increasing the effective patent life, the Waxman-Hatch Act may have raised the expected 
marginal revenue associated with R&D through the X-vector in equation 2, and thereby 
stimulated R&D intensity after the mid-1980s.  
However, the Waxman-Hatch Act also simultaneously lowered entry barriers for generic 
products at patent expiration. Since 1984, producers of generic drugs no longer must prove safety 
and effectiveness but only show that their versions are bioequivalent to brand name drugs. 
Consequently, the act made it less costly for generics to enter the market once the patent period 
for the branded version expires, thereby reducing expected returns on branded drugs and R&D 
intensity through the X-vector in equation 2. Because of the opposing tendencies resulting from 
patent extension and quickened generic entry, the effect of the Waxman-Hatch Act on   6
pharmaceutical R&D spending is theoretically ambiguous and remains an empirical question 
(Grabowski & Vernon, 1986, 1992).   
Finally, R&D intensity continued to rise to 17.3 percent in 1994 along with real drug 
prices, and then leveled off, but with much fluctuation, to 16.7 percent in 2001. The relative 
instability of pharmaceutical R&D spending since 1994 may have resulted from the variability in 
real drug prices. 
In sum, the time series data in exhibit 1 provide some support for the hypothesized direct 
relation between real drug prices and pharmaceutical R&D spending. As pointed out, however, a 
couple of public policies aimed at the pharmaceutical industry were also introduced during the 
50-year period. Consequently, we must hold constant the introduction of these policies and other 
factors before we can isolate the pairwise relation between real drug prices and pharmaceutical 
R&D. In the next section, we use multiple regression analysis to examine the isolated impact of 
real drug prices on pharmaceutical R&D. 
 
3. Empirical Model of Pharmaceutical R&D Spending  
 
Based upon the preceding discussion and our conceptual model depicted by equation 2, 
we specify the following multiple regression model to explain year-to-year changes in industry 
R&D intensity over the period 1952 to 2001. A high degree of serial correlation necessitated first 
differencing of the data (after taking logs). We define the variables LnRDS, LnP, LnY, and LnFS 
to represent the natural logarithm of R&D intensity, real drugs price, real GDP per capita, and 
foreign sales as a percentage of total sales, respectively.  KH and WH, stand for two dummy 
variables representing the years for which the Kefauver-Harris Amendment (enacted in 1962) 
and the Waxman-Hatch Act (enacted in 1984) were in effect.  Our regression model is: 
t t t t t WH KH LnFS LnY LnP LnRDS ε β β β β β β + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − − − 5 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0        (3) 
Given the logarithmic transformation of the continuous variables, the slope parameters on 
the first three independent variables can be treated as elasticities.
x  Based on the conceptual 
model, the elasticity estimate on real drug price, β1, is expected to be greater than zero because of 
the derived-demand nature of R&D spending and the lower opportunity costs associated with 
internal funds. Real GDP (Y) should control for any demand-pull effects on R&D investment. 
For example, rising real income may increase the demand for pharmaceutical products, through   7
the X-vector in equation 2, and thereby potentially raises the expected returns to R&D. Because 
R&D is specified as a fraction of sales, the expected sign of the elasticity estimate β2 depends on 
whether real GDP has a greater impact on pharmaceutical R&D or sales at the margin. That is, a 
growing economy may increase pharmaceutical sales more rapidly than expenditures on R&D, 
especially if decisions involving R&D respond to sales growth with a lag.  
The third independent variable, FS, measures the percentage of total industry drug sales 
occurring outside the U.S.  Because our dependent variable is the ratio of global R&D to global 
sales, and our explanatory variables are measures of U.S. prices and U.S. GDP, this variable 
serves as a control.  Within this context, it is expected that increasing foreign sales will also exert 
a demand-pull impact on R&D, and thereby acts through the X-vector in equation 2. Thus, the 
coefficient estimate on the foreign sales variable, β3, is expected to be positive. 
A one-year lag was employed for the first three variables because firm managers will 
most likely respond to the current economic environment when deciding how much to allocate to 
R&D in the forthcoming year.  Moreover, a lagged value of real drug prices should also capture 
any cash-flow effect that might be driving R&D investment intensity.  Indeed, if imperfections 
exist in the capital markets for pharmaceutical R&D finance, then drug prices lagged one period 
will also be a proxy for the industry’s level of internal funds.
xi  
As mentioned above, the Kefauver-Harris Amendment may have caused the level of 
R&D intensity to slow due to the additional costs associated with more FDA-required clinical 
testing, and longer FDA approval times. If so, the KH dummy variable works through the Z-
vector in equation 2, and the estimated coefficient β4 should be found negative. The effect of the 
Waxman-Hatch Act, which increased effective patent lives for branded pharmaceuticals while 
simultaneously lowering entry barriers for generic products at patent expiration, is theoretically 
ambiguous.  The WH dummy variable simultaneously raises and lowers the X-vector in equation 
2 such that the sign on its coefficient estimate β5 will determine which effect dominates at the 
margin.
xii  Finally, with respect to the policy dummy variables, our specification allows for the 
possibility that these regulations affect the growth rate of R&D intensity (and not just the level 
of R&D)
xiii.   
Estimation of equation (3) by ordinary least squares resulted in the coefficient estimates 
and corresponding t-statistics reported in Exhibit 2. Before discussing the results in detail, we 
note that the CUSUM test for stability of beta coefficients (Greene, 2002) is not statistically   8
significant. Therefore, even though our data span a period of fifty years, there is no evidence of 
instability in the regression model. We also tested for the presence of heteroscedasticity with an 
ARCH test (Greene, 2002), but found none. Hence, our OLS results provide consistent estimates 
of the true model parameters. The Durbin Watson statistic of 2.01 implies that our lag 
specification in equation (3) captures the relevant degree of serial correlation. Last, we note that 
the (unadjusted) R
2 of 0.44 is relatively high for this type of time series model based on (lagged) 
first-differenced data. 
 As anticipated, the elasticity estimate on the price variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that pharmaceutical R&D intensity rises as real drug 
prices increase.
xiv  The elasticity estimate of 0.58 suggests that a 10 percent increase in the 
growth of real drug prices is associated with nearly a 6 percent increase in the growth of R&D 
intensity. Our estimate is remarkably similar to the 0.61 elasticity estimate obtained by Scherer 
(1996) in his analysis of cash flow and R&D. Recall that our drug price measure may capture a 
cash-flow effect as well as a derived-demand effect.  
The elasticity estimate on real GDP per capita growth is negative but not statistically 
different from zero.  Apparently, both pharmaceutical sales and R&D expenditures increase at 
the same rate in response to a growing economy. The estimated coefficient on the variable 
reflecting the percentage of sales coming from outside the U.S. market is also positive and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that increased foreign sales raises R&D intensity, ceteris 
paribus.  
Regarding our policy dummy variables the sign on Kefauver-Harris dummy variable is 
negative and statistically significant (p-value = 0.06).  This suggests that the 1962 Amendment 
may have had a negative impact on the growth of industry R&D intensity. Indeed, the estimate of 
–0.04 implies that the 1962 Act was associated with a sizeable impact on the growth of 
pharmaceutical R&D by reducing the trend from an annual growth rate of seven percent, as 
captured by the intercept term, to three percent (i.e., 0.07-0.04).  Similarly, the estimated 
parameter on the Waxman-Hatch dummy also carries a negative sign, suggesting that the net 
effect of this Act was to diminish R&D growth rates slightly. However, unlike the Kefauver-
Harris dummy, this coefficient is not different from zero at conventional levels of statistical 
significance, perhaps reflecting the opposing tendencies of the effective patent life extension and   9
the quickening of generic entry. Thus, the results suggest that the Waxman-Hatch Act had no 
marginal impact on pharmaceutical R&D beyond that of the Kefauver-Harris amendment.  
 
4. Policy Considerations: Examining the Potential Impact of Price Controls in the U.S. 
 
The debate over prescription drug prices in the United States is both long standing and 
contentious.  The question of whether or not the U.S. should, like most foreign governments, 
regulate drug prices has been debated for years.  Opponents maintain that price regulation in the 
U.S. would be detrimental to future pharmaceutical innovation.  They argue that investment in 
pharmaceutical R&D, which is driven by expected future profitability (and prices), would 
decline considerably and lead to fewer new drugs for future generations.
xv  Supporters of price 
controls, however, argue that prices (and profits) in the U.S. are too high, and that price controls 
are necessary to ensure low-cost access to prescription medications for all Americans.   
If nothing else, it should be immediately apparent that a stark tradeoff exists between 
greater access to prescription drugs today and pharmaceutical innovation tomorrow, especially 
given our empirical finding regarding the direct relation between drug prices and pharmaceutical 
R&D spending.  Our objective in this section, therefore, is to probe more deeply into the precise 
quantitative nature of this tradeoff.  To accomplish this objective we perform a simple 
experiment. We assume Congress enacted a law in 1980 requiring pharmaceutical prices in the 
U.S. to grow no faster than the general price level.   This approach mirrors one of the actual 
mandates in the Veteran’s Health Care Act of 1992: namely, that drug prices paid by federal 
agencies cannot grow at a rate faster than the urban consumer price index.  Thus, while our 
experiment is couched within a hypothetical (and historical) context, it will nevertheless reflect 
an actual approach employed by the Federal Government to control pharmaceutical prices (albeit 
on a relatively small scale).     
Therefore, using our estimated model of the determinants of pharmaceutical R&D 
intensity, we simulate prescription drug price controls in the U.S. by imposing the following 
inequality constraint (which occurs in year T):
xvi 
0 ≤ ∆ t LnP      ( )         ( 4 )   T t ≥ ∀
However, unlike the Veteran’s Health Care Act, our legislation assumes this pricing constraint 
was applied to all pharmaceutical prices, and not just those drugs purchased by federal agencies.    10
Because our objective is to measure the economic cost of pharmaceutical price controls, and 
since the average new pharmaceutical product spends approximately 16 years in development, 
we choose to “enact” our policy in 1980 (T=1980), and then evaluate its implications for forgone 
R&D investment.  Furthermore, good estimates of the R&D costs associated with bringing a new 
drug to market are available for this time period (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 2003)
xvii. 
To examine the consequences of price controls for aggregate R&D spending we proceed 
in two steps: First, we use the results from the regression model to estimate a time series of 
expected R&D intensity conditional on the actual history of the independent variables. And 
second, we impose the previously discussed inequality constraint on the growth rate of 
pharmaceutical prices to simulate the impact of price controls on aggregate R&D spending.  
Specifically, to transform the regression model from first differences (in logs) to levels, 
we define gt as the period t growth rate in RDS: . We assume that the growth 
rate follows a normal distribution with conditional mean 
t g
t t e RDS RDS 1 − =
t g  and variance  . Then, by the 




2 ) 2 / 1 (
1) ( ) (
t t g
t t e RDS E RDS E
ϑ +
− = . Clearly, these variables are not directly observable but 
may be estimated from the results of our regression model. To this end, we define the average 
growth rate for period t as: 
WH KH LnFS LnY LnP g t t t t 5 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ β β β β β β + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = − − −  (5) 
where the estimated parameter values,βs, are from the multiple regression equation in exhibit 2. 
The variance is given by: 
ˆ
) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( 5 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0
2 WH KH LnFS LnY LnP Var t t t t β β β β β β ϑ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = − − −  (6) 
and it may be easily computed from the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated beta vector. 
Using these values we have constructed a time series of expected R&D intensity starting with 
1953 (i.e.,  0.046). = 0 RDS
xviii Exhibit 3 displays the actual values of RDS and their computed 
expected (or fitted) values. Visual inspection reveals that the fitted values track very well the 
actual levels of R&D intensity over the sample time period (1954-2001); the most notable 
exception is the period in the late seventies and early eighties when the actual level of R&D 
intensity was relatively flat. Overall, this graph validates our first-differences model; since the R
2 
from our regression is 0.44, the estimated growth rate measures the true growth rate with error.   11
The addition of  in the exponent of the expected RDS reduces, but does not totally 
eliminate, this error. 
2 ) 2 / 1 ( t ϑ
The second step in our analysis is the simulation of price controls. To implement these 
restrictions, beginning with 1980 we set the change in log prices to zero whenever the growth 
rate in pharmaceutical prices was higher than the rate of growth in the general price level. The 
estimated level of expected RDS is displayed in Exhibit 4 along with the actual level of RDS; the 
graph also shows a lower and upper bound for the constrained estimate of RDS based on +/- two 
standard errors. The confidence band around this estimate remains fairly tight over this time 
period, implying that our estimates of expected R&D intensity are relatively well measured.  
  The results in Exhibit 4 illustrate the considerable effect our hypothetical price control 
policy would have had on R&D investment.  Specifically, our model predicts that had 
pharmaceutical prices been constrained to grow no faster than the general price level during this 
period, R&D intensity would have remained relatively constant, at about 9 percent, through the 
1980’s and 1990’s.  This is in contrast to actual R&D intensity, which nearly doubled over this 
time period (from approximately 9 percent to 17 percent). 
  Within the context of this experiment it is also possible to approximate forgone R&D 
expenditures (rather than R&D intensity) between 1980 and 2001.  However, we do not know 
how real pharmaceutical sales (i.e., the quantity of drugs sold) might react to a price control 
regime.  Therefore, we make two alternative assumptions to predict lower and upper bound 
estimates of forgone R&D. First, to obtain a lower-bound estimate of forgone R&D, we assume 
that once price controls were enacted in 1980, real pharmaceutical sales remained constant until 
2001 (real pharmaceutical sales roughly doubled over this time period for U.S. manufacturers). 
To obtain an upper bound estimate, we simply assume that real pharmaceutical sales were 
unaffected by the price control policy.
xix   That is, we use actual pharmaceutical sales observed 
over this time period in our calculations.
xx   Making these assumptions allows us to apply our 
predicted estimates of R&D intensity to obtain a predicted measure of forgone R&D 
expenditures.   
  Mathematically, for any year t, let St be the actual sales level, and ERDSt
c  b e  t h e  
expected R&D intensity when the rate of growth in pharmaceutical prices is constrained to be 
less than or equal to the growth in the CPI. Then, we may define RDt
L  = S1980 (RDSt - ERDSt
c ) 
as the low estimate of R&D spending lost because of price controls; similarly, RDt
H = St (RDSt -   12
ERDSt
c ) may be defined as the high estimate. Then, the cumulative level of forgone (or lost) 
pharmaceutical R&D expenditures, RD
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F L     (7) 
where T=1980 and r equals the opportunity cost of R&D capital. Following DiMasi, Hansen and 
Grabowski (2003) we use an 11 percent real cost of capital. 
In addition to reporting forgone R&D, we also calculate a rough first approximation of 
what this might have translated into in terms of fewer new drugs brought to market.  To perform 
this calculation we divide our estimate of forgone R&D by $802 million, the DiMasi et al. 
estimate of the cost of bring a new drug to market.  Our calculations are reported in Exhibit 5. 
  As Exhibit 5 shows, the cumulative costs associated with pharmaceutical price controls 
(as defined in our policy experiment) are substantial. Between $265 and $293 billion of 
capitalized R&D expenditures would have been lost. These forgone R&D expenditures translate 
to roughly 28 to 31 percent of the actual capitalized R&D expenditures observed over this time 
period. Using DiMasi et al.’s estimated cost of $802 million per new drug, this suggests between 
330 and 365 new drugs would not have been brought to market in the global economy, ceteris 
paribus.  To be certain, our calculations involve several critical assumptions, and should not be 
extrapolated over future time horizons where industry and market conditions may be quite 
different.  That being said, however, our primary objective is to illuminate the potential 
economic costs that pharmaceutical price controls in the U.S. could impose on R&D spending; 
we examined these potential costs in a historical, yet hopefully meaningful, context.
xxi  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the impact of real drug prices on the R&D spending of major U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies. Theoretically, drug prices are expected to directly influence R&D 
spending because of both a derived-demand and cash-flow effect. Using industry-level data for 
the period 1952 to 2001, our multiple regression findings support this expected direct effect. 
Specifically, the estimated coefficient on the drug price variable suggests that a 10 percent 
increase in real drug prices results in nearly a 6 percent increase in pharmaceutical R&D 
spending. Simulations based upon these multiple regression results indicate that the capitalized   13
value of pharmaceutical R&D spending would have been about 30 percent lower if the federal 
government had limited drug prices increases to the same rate of growth as the general consumer 
price index during the period 1980 to 2001. Moreover, drug price controls would have resulted in 
330 to 365 fewer new drugs being brought to market during that same time period.  
Our findings suggest that the tradeoff between improved access to pharmaceuticals today, 
and innovation tomorrow, may be much greater than previously thought.  Furthermore, since our 
analysis focuses on strictly on the costs associated with pharmaceutical price controls, both in 
terms of forgone R&D investment and new drugs, it is important to keep in mind this is just one 
side of the economic issue.  Meaningful social policy will need to weigh such potential costs 
against the economic benefits that would be achieved through greater access to prescription 
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Exhibit 2: Regression Results (Dependent Variable is the Change in the Logarithm of 












Intercept 0.069  4.425  0.0001 
[] 1 log − ∆ t P   0.583 2.312  0.0130 
[] 1 log − ∆ t FS   0.173 3.018  0.0020 
[] 1 log − ∆ t Y   -0.211 -0.756  0.4540 
KH -0.037  -1.910  0.0640 











F-statistic 6.57  Sample  Size 48 
Durbin-Watson 2.01     
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Exhibit 5: The Economic Cost of Pharmaceutical Price Controls (in US $2000) 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
i This estimate included both the R&D costs of failed projects (only a fraction of drugs in the 
R&D “pipeline” ever succeed in making it to market) and the opportunity costs associated with 
the R&D capital. 
  
ii Like Scherer, our industry-level data for pharmaceutical R&D expenditures come from the 
Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association (PhRMA).  PhRMA pools publicly 
unavailable firm data on pharmaceutical R&D (as distinct from total firm R&D) and reports 
them in the aggregate exclusively, then the individual firm data are destroyed as stipulated by 
contract. 
 
iii Various methods and control variables have been adopted in order to mitigate this limitation in 
the data (see, for example, Vernon 2003). 
 
iv Although a profit control scheme like that used in the United Kingdom might be less 
devastating for R&D. We thank F.M. Scherer for bringing this point to our attention. 
 
v For many decades now the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) 
has collected data on the sales and research expenditures of the major drug companies in its 
association.  As mentioned in the text, Scherer (2001) used these data to document a remarkably 
high correlation between gross pharmaceutical profit margins and R&D spending during the 
period 1962 to 1996. In addition to finding a high correlation between these two time series, 
Scherer also found a high correlation between these series when their deviations from an 
exponential trend were considered. The later comparison removes the potentially confounding 
effects that may be present in a direct comparison between two serially correlated time series. 
 
vi We adjust for global conditions outside the U.S. by including the ratio of foreign to total sales 
as an additional explanatory variable in the estimated equations.   
 
vii The pharmaceutical producer price index (PPI) might be used instead of the pharmaceutical 
CPI.  However, data are unavailable for the PPI for years prior to 1986 so the CPI was used in 
our analyses. 
The two indices were highly correlated over the 1986-2001-time period (with a Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient of 0.92).   
 
viii Beginning in 1995, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has taken steps to correct some of these 
biases in the pharmaceutical price index. 
 
ix It has also been argued that scientific research opportunities were falling around this time (e.g., 
Bailey, 1972).   
 
x Data for real drugs prices and real GDP per capita are obtained at http://www.bls.gov and 
http://www.bea.gov, respectively.  
    20
                                                                                                                                                             
xi We experimented with longer lag structures, but the one-year lag proved superior in terms of 
statistical significance and explanatory power.  
 
xii In response to a comment by F.M. Scherer on a previous draft of this paper, we also included 
the percentage of pharmaceutical expenditures that were out-of-pocket expenses as an additional 
explanatory variable in the estimation equation. Out-of-pocket expenses fell from nearly 100 
percent at the beginning of the period to under 35 percent by 2001. Greater insurance coverage 
should have lowered demand elasticities, raised price cost margins, and thereby increased R&D 
intensity. While the sign of the coefficient estimate on the (first difference after taking logs) out-
of-pocket variable was found to be positive, it was not different from zero at conventional levels 
of statistical significance. 
 
xiii It should be noted that whether the regulations affected the growth rate of R&D, as opposed to 
just the level of R&D, is an empirical question. 
 
xiv Reverse causality can be ruled out for two reasons. First, because of its sunk cost nature, drug 
prices are unaffected by R&D expenditures in the short run. Secondly, the dependent variable 
measures the R&D intensity of the major pharmaceutical companies while our measure of real 
drug price reflects the prices of all pharmaceutical companies.  
 
xv Also, if capital market imperfections exist in the market for pharmaceutical R&D finance, then 
reduced profits will also affect firm cash flows and reduce R&D even farther.  Our P variable in 
the last section is designed to capture both of these effects. 
 
xvi It should be noted that condition (4) would have been a binding constraint during this period 
in every year from 1980 to 2001, with the exception of 1995. 
 
xvii DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski estimated the average cost of developing a NCE by 
examining cost data for drugs entering human testing between 1983 and 1994; their estimate 
($802 million) included R&D costs incurred up to the year 2000 for these drugs. Thus, their 
estimate is appropriate for use in our policy experiment, which considers the forgone investment 
in R&D from 1981-2001.  
 
xviii Because we employ one-period lags in our log-first-differences model specification, our 
estimated model is based on the sample time period from 1954-2001. 
 
xix We consider this to be an upper bound because several recent studies suggest that 
pharmaceutical price controls in the U.S. would, on net, result in a decline in total 
pharmaceutical revenues (see, for example, Grabowski (1994) and the references therein). 
 
xx It is worth mentioning that our estimates may be conservative because our sample, and thus 
our estimates of forgone R&D are based on data from PhRMA members only.  While it may be 
true that non-PhRMA members will be less affected by U.S. price control policies, they are 
nevertheless likely to be affected (at least for those firms selling pharmaceuticals in the U.S.).  
Thus, it is important to note that for PhRMA members annual pharmaceutical sales totaled   21
                                                                                                                                                             
roughly 179 billion dollars in 2001; IMS reports global pharmaceutical sales at 364 billion in 
2001. (http://secure.imshealth.com/public/structure/dispcontent/1,2779,1343-1343-1441)  
 
xxi Our estimates of the loss in R&D spending and new drugs from a price control regime are 
subject to the following considerations. First, large pharmaceutical companies may spend beyond 
the efficient level on R&D because a substantial amount of testing not required by the FDA may 
be done for marketing purposes to distinguish one drug from other substitutes. If price-cost 
margins of large pharmaceutical companies were thinner, less of this optional or socially 
superfluous testing would be done. If large pharmaceutical companies do engage in a significant 
amount of optional testing, our estimates, which are based on actual R&D spending rather than 
socially efficient R&D spending, may overstate the social significance of the amount of R&D 
spending and new drugs lost. Second, much would depend on the nature of the controls such as 
whether the prices of really important new drugs were controlled more or less stringently. We 
thank F.M. Scherer for bringing these two important considerations to our attention.  